I'm a philosophy instructor currently earning an MBA from Baylor University. My current research is in epistemology, business ethics, and philosophy of religion. I've taught logic, ethics, intro to philosophy, and death and dying, and I'm currently teaching on personal identity. My dissertation, in epistemology, was directed by Jonathan Kvanvig.

I love to travel, try new food, mountain bike, run, and play sports and other games with friends.

This is my academic page. For my non-academic professional experience, see my LinkedIn page.

Here's a description of my recent publications and dissertation:

Recent and forthcoming work:

1. Defusing the Common Sense Problem of Evil, Faith and Philosophy (2015)

Abstract: The inductive argument from evil contains the premise that, probably, there is gratuitous evil. According to traditional formulations, the argument for this premise involves an inference, a "noseeum" inference,” from the proposition that we don't see a good reason for some evil to the proposition that it appears that there is no good reason for that evil. One brand of skeptical theism involves using a principle, CORNEA, to block the inference. Recently, however, the common sense problem of evil threatens the relevance of these skeptical theists' project. Proponents of the common sense problem of evil hold that there need not be any inference to justify the belief that there is gratuitous evil. Rather, someone can have non-inferential prima facie justification, or at least a pro tanto reason, for her belief that there is gratuitous evil. In this paper, I argue that the common sense problem of evil doesn't avoid CORNEA and that CORNEA, or a reformulated version of it, helps prevent anyone from having any justification for the belief that there is gratuitous evil.

2. Religious Epistemology, Philosophy Compass 10:8 (2015), with Trent Dougherty

Abstract: Religious epistemology is the study of how subjects' religious beliefs might have, or fail to have, some form of positive epistemic status (such as knowledge, justification, warrant, rationality, etc.). The current debate is focused upon the kind of basis upon which a religious believer might rationally hold certain beliefs about God (whether God exists, what attributes God has, what God is doing, etc.). Engaging this issue are three groups of people who call themselves "fideists," "reformed epistemologists," and "evidentialists." Each group has a position, but the positions are not mutually exclusive in every case, and in the debate, the names better describe the groups' emphases rather than mutually exclusive positions in the debate. In this article, we will first give a brief historical survey of evidentialism, fideism, and reformed epistemology. Second, we will give the fideist's position. Third, we will give the evidentialist's position. Fourth, we will give the reformed epistemologist's position, and last, we will include some comments on the current state of the debate, where we will show that the groups' positions are not mutually exclusive.

3. Splitting the Horns of Euthyphro's Modal Relative, Faith and Philosophy (April 2013)

Abstract: There is a modal relative of Euthyphro's dilemma that goes like this: are necessary truths true because God affirms them, or does God affirm them because they're true? If you accept the first horn, necessary truths are as contingent as God's free will. If you accept the second, God is less ultimate than the modal ontology that establishes certain truths as necessary. If you try to split the horns by affirming that necessary truths are somehow grounded in God's nature, Brian Leftow meets you with an argument. I will argue that Leftow's argument fails and that, contrary to his argument, there is a good reason to believe that necessary truths are grounded in God's nature.

4. On Reflection, Hilary Kornblith, Journal of Moral Philosophy, book review (2015)


In my dissertation, directed by Jon Kvanvig, my ultimate goal is to provide a foundation for ethical reasoning, in particular a kind of Mooreanism about ethics. When we disagree with others who seem to be our epistemic peers or superiors, and when we doubt the reliability of, say, our fundamental ethical intuitions, we need a place to start. Common sense philosophers give us this advice about what to do in these situations: begin with what's obvious. No one, though, has said what it is for something to be obvious. In my dissertation, I say what it is for something to be obvious, then I say how my account can help provide starting points in the face of disagreement and skeptical threats, starting points that lay the foundation for philosophical views, especially views about ethics.