I'm a philosophy instructor at Baylor University. I'm currently teaching Contemporary Ethical Issues. Previously, I've taught Business Ethics, Ethics, Philosophy of Death and Dying, Personal Identity, Formal Logic, Critical Thinking, and Introduction to Philosophy.
My current research is on the intersection of Epistemology and Ethics. My project involves engaging the Epistemological literature, Philosophical literature on intellectual virtues, and Psychological literature on cognitive biases to argue for and apply a position according to which someone can construe their evidence in different ways, and, as a result, come to different conclusions. As part of the project, I will investigate what occurs when we construe evidence differently from one another, the various ways in which we can construe evidence, whether construing the evidence differently can be epistemically rational, and how we ought to evaluate our construals of the evidence. This work builds on my doctoral research, directed by Jonathan Kvanvig, in which I lay the foundation for Mooreanism about Ethics. In this earlier work, I discuss starting points in moral reasoning, obviousness, peer and expert disagreement, and what to do in the face of self-doubt.
I love to travel, try new food, mountain bike, run, and play sports and other games with friends.
Here's a description of my recent publications and dissertation:
Abstract: The inductive argument from evil contains the premise that, probably, there is gratuitous evil. According to traditional formulations, the argument for this premise involves an inference, a "noseeum" inference, from the proposition that we don't see a good reason for some evil to the proposition that it appears that there is no good reason for that evil. One brand of skeptical theism involves using a principle, CORNEA, to block the inference. Recently, however, the common sense problem of evil threatens the relevance of these skeptical theists' project. Proponents of the common sense problem of evil hold that there need not be any inference to justify the belief that there is gratuitous evil. Rather, someone can have non-inferential prima facie justification, or at least a pro tanto reason, for her belief that there is gratuitous evil. In this paper, I argue that the common sense problem of evil doesn't avoid CORNEA and that CORNEA, or a reformulated version of it, helps prevent anyone from having any justification for the belief that there is gratuitous evil.
Abstract: Religious epistemology is the study of how subjects' religious beliefs might have, or fail to have, some form of positive epistemic status (such as knowledge, justification, warrant, rationality, etc.). The current debate is focused upon the kind of basis upon which a religious believer might rationally hold certain beliefs about God (whether God exists, what attributes God has, what God is doing, etc.). Engaging this issue are three groups of people who call themselves "fideists," "reformed epistemologists," and "evidentialists." Each group has a position, but the positions are not mutually exclusive in every case, and in the debate, the names better describe the groups' emphases rather than mutually exclusive positions in the debate. In this article, we will first give a brief historical survey of evidentialism, fideism, and reformed epistemology. Second, we will give the fideist's position. Third, we will give the evidentialist's position. Fourth, we will give the reformed epistemologist's position, and last, we will include some comments on the current state of the debate, where we will show that the groups' positions are not mutually exclusive.
Abstract: There is a modal relative of Euthyphro's dilemma that goes like this: are necessary truths true because God affirms them, or does God affirm them because they're true? If you accept the first horn, necessary truths are as contingent as God's free will. If you accept the second, God is less ultimate than the modal ontology that establishes certain truths as necessary. If you try to split the horns by affirming that necessary truths are somehow grounded in God's nature, Brian Leftow meets you with an argument. I will argue that Leftow's argument fails and that, contrary to his argument, there is a good reason to believe that necessary truths are grounded in God's nature.
In my dissertation, directed by Jon Kvanvig, my ultimate goal is to provide a foundation for ethical reasoning, in particular a kind of Mooreanism about ethics. When we disagree with others who seem to be our epistemic peers or superiors, and when we doubt the reliability of, say, our fundamental ethical intuitions, we need a place to start. Common sense philosophers give us this advice about what to do in these situations: begin with what's obvious. No one, though, has said what it is for something to be obvious. In my dissertation, I say what it is for something to be obvious, then I say how my account can help provide starting points in the face of disagreement and skeptical threats, starting points that lay the foundation for philosophical views, especially views about ethics.