I am a philosophy professor at Christopher Newport University. Previously an entrepreneur and research analyst, I now teach business ethics, value theory, and other philosophy courses. My main research areas include epistemology, business ethics, and philosophy of religion.
This report examines the connected car software developer sector to highlight innovations and new consumer experiences that will come to car models in the next year. It hones in on software and apps that can be built on top of a car's embedded operating system and concludes with a five-year forecast of connected car sales in the U.S.
The sharing economy describes new business models built on the proliferation of smartphone and app use and the shared resources from these device owners. These business models are characterized by real-time data and location, on-demand pricing, and easy payment. This report examines these models' success factors and the extent of their disruption in five industry sectors, and it concludes with the next a prediction of the next five sectors to see disruptive business models from the sharing economy.
In-vehicle connectivity has made cars the next great apps platform, but vehicles are distinct from other devices due to safety concerns, product development timelines, and product ownership models. This report addresses issues facing the connected car app ecosystem, provides insight on consumer perspectives on connected car apps, and assesses four connected vehicle app strategies.
This report analyzes trends in the development of tethered and native apps for smart watches. It highlights perspectives from watch brands, app developers, and consumers about the most significant smart watch use cases and business strategies to increase usage and boost brand loyalty. It concludes with a five-year global smart watch sales forecast.
This report analyzes market competition in the mobile payment industry, focusing on business strategies of payment platforms developers, including Apple Pay, Android Pay, PayPal, and emerging solution providers. It also examines external factors that shape market adoption trajectory, including merchants' adoption of EMV standards, e-commerce growth, and payment network providers' business strategies. It concludes with a five-year forecast of U.S. mobile payment users and mobile payment transaction values.
The inductive argument from evil to the non-existence of God contains the premise that, probably, there is gratuitous evil. Some skeptical theists object: one's justification for the premise that, probably, there is gratuitous evil involves an inference from the proposition that we don't see a good reason for some evil to the proposition that it appears that there is no good reason for that evil, and they use a principle, "CORNEA," to block that inference. The common sense problem of evil threatens the CORNEA move, because the common sense problem of evil does not involve any inference to justify the belief that there is gratuitous evil. In this paper, I argue that the common sense problem of evil doesn't avoid CORNEA. CORNEA, or a reformulated version of it, can still prevent one from having justification for the belief that there is gratuitous evil.
Religious epistemology is the study of how subjects' religious beliefs might have, or fail to have knowledge, justification, warrant, or rationality. The current debate is focused upon the kind of basis upon which a religious believer might rationally hold certain beliefs about God, e.g. whether God exists, what attributes God has, what God is doing. In this paper, we give a brief description and historical survey of three of the main positions in the debate: evidentialism, fideism, and reformed epistemology, and we then show that the aforementioned positions are compatible.
Are necessary truths true because God affirms them, or does God affirm them because they're true? If you accept the first, necessary truths are as contingent as God's free will. If you accept the second, God is less ultimate than the modal ontology that establishes certain truths as necessary. If you go for a third option by affirming that necessary truths are somehow grounded in God's nature, Brian Leftow meets you with an argument. I argue that Leftow's argument fails and that, contrary to his argument, there is a good reason to believe that necessary truths are grounded in God's nature.
Hilary Kornblith argues that reflection is not more valuable than unreflective processes, because reflection is not different in kind from unreflective processes. Reflection, then, has no special role in whether we know, are reasonable, are able to exercise free will, or are able to act as we should. I summarize Kornblith’s arguments and provide a reason to think that Kornblith’s arguments fail; if the arguments are successful, they give us reason to believe that reflection is more valuable than his arguments indicate.